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SOPHISTICATION, BRIDGING THE GAP, AND THE
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION: AN EMPIRICAL AND
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS∗
By Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia, and
Glenn L. Christensen∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent commentary has rightly lamented the uncertain state
of the multifactor test for trademark infringement. “This heuristic
device is the fulcrum of American trademark law,” yet the courts
are in substantial disagreement as to which factors are relevant to
an evaluation of the likelihood of confusion.1 The doctrinal divide is
substantial: “Some circuits claim to weigh heavily under certain
factors what other circuits claim to ignore, and nearly every factor
or combination of factors has been called the ‘most important’ by
one court or another.”2
Despite this doctrinal disarray on a test of such central
importance to trademark law, the multifactor inquiry has not been
subjected to extensive scholarly analysis. The courts rarely
evaluate the consumer confusion inquiry in light of “specific and
persuasive evidence about consumer behavior,” relying instead on
precedent built “on personal intuition and subjective, internalized
stereotypes.”3 And even the academic commentary is surprisingly
bereft of careful scrutiny of the test.4 Recent commentary rightly
notes that the fields of “cognitive and consumer psychology” have

∗ This article is based on the lead author’s presentation at INTA’s Fourth Learned
Professor’s Symposium held in New York City on January 3, 2008.
∗∗ Thomas R. Lee, Professor of Law, Brigham Young University; Academic Member,
International Trademark Association; Eric D. DeRosia, Assistant Professor, Marriott School
of Management, Brigham Young University; Glenn L Christensen, Assistant Professor,
Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University. All authors contributed
equally to this project. Special thanks to Joseph Benson, Elise Briggs, John Nielsen, and
Margo Scott for their research assistance. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the
generous support of research grants from the Institute of Marketing and the Marriott
School of Management at Brigham Young University.
1. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 1582 (2006).
2. Id. at 1583.
3. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 721, 723, 772 (2004).
4. Beebe, supra note 1, at 1584 (noting that the “multifactor tests have received little
academic analysis beyond that of the treatise writers, and no empirical analysis”).
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“much to offer those interested in trademark law.”5 Yet these and
other calls for an interdisciplinary analysis of trademark law have
yielded precious few contributions to our collective understanding
of the factors that affect the likelihood of consumer confusion.6
Even Barton Beebe, who has made an important contribution in
his recent study of “which factors . . . actually drive the outcome of
the test” based on a careful empirical study of trademark opinions
in the federal courts, is careful to distinguish his evaluation of
what does affect judicial outcomes from what ought to.7
This article takes up the “ought” question with respect to two
factors at the center of the doctrinal debate in the courts: the
relative “sophistication” of consumers in the relevant market and
the likelihood that the senior trademark holder may “bridge the
gap” to bring itself in closer competition with the junior user. With
respect to both of these factors, there are important points of
conflict in the case law. The conflicts go to such fundamental
questions as (a) whether (and when) a sophisticated consumer
might sometimes be more likely to be confused—the effect opposite
of that almost unanimously predicted in the case law; and (b)
whether (and how) a senior trademark holder can demonstrate an
increased likelihood of confusion based on its plans to extend its
brand to a new market.
In Part II below, we summarize the state of the law on the
“sophistication” and “bridging the gap” factors, setting the stage
for the need for careful analysis of conflicts that are currently
plaguing the courts. Part III describes a theoretical model for
understanding the role of these factors in the likelihood of
confusion analysis. In this section, we develop models derived from
consumer psychology literature in an attempt to inject some

5. Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary
Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TMR 1013, 1014 (2001). See also
id. at 1068 (asserting that trademark practitioners and judges should no longer “rely on
common sense or speculation regarding how the consumer’s mind operates,” and that “new
findings regarding cognitive processes” can provide a “scientific foundation” for the law to
replace “unreliable intuition” and “junk science”); Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary
Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TMR 943, 945 (2006) (asserting that recent advances in
“marketing and consumer psychology . . . possess untapped potential” in facilitating “more
predictable, accurate and consumer-beneficial outcomes in trademark conflicts”).
6. A recent exception is our own attempt at presenting a theoretical model for
understanding—and, to some extent, critiquing—the judicial understanding of the
consumer “sophistication” factor. Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia,
Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 Emory L. J. 575
(2007). The model developed in this article is summarized and applied at some length below.
Jerre Swann has also offered some recent interdisciplinary commentary on consumer
sophistication. See Jerre B. Swann, Sophistication and the Sciences, 97 TMR 1309 (2007).
7. Beebe, supra note 1, at 1600 (explaining that his study attempts to “settle the
debate” as to the relative significance of the various factors—“at least with respect to the
question of is rather than ought”).
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coherence into the empty debate that marks the case law. Finally,
we introduce and describe in Part IV an empirical study aimed at
measuring the relative significance and interactions between these
two factors.
Our theoretical model and empirical study support the
hypothesis that the likelihood of consumer confusion is increased
when a competitor of the senior trademark holder has “bridged the
gap” to come into competition with the junior user. Thus, our
analysis supports the view adopted by a minority of the federal
circuits (five of thirteen)—that the prospect for “gap-bridging” is
relevant to the likelihood of confusion. Our study also informs the
debate in the case law as to the method of proving the likelihood of
“bridging the gap.” Specifically, our findings support a consumercentric approach to “bridging the gap” instead of a manager-centric
one. Whatever makes a brand extension by the senior mark more
plausible in the eyes of consumers will increase the likelihood of
confusion—regardless of whether managers of the senior mark
actually intend to “bridge the gap” into the new market.
Perhaps more significantly, we show that a more
“sophisticated” consumer is more likely to suffer confusion in these
circumstances. The case law is marked by a rather vacuous conflict
between the widely invoked presumption that sophistication
“usually militates against a finding of a likelihood of confusion”
and the occasional—and precisely opposite—qualification that “it
might on occasion increase the likelihood of confusion.”8 Our
findings identify one particular circumstance in which the
occasional qualification holds and the usual presumption fails. Our
theoretical analysis also explains the basis for this phenomenon,
and thus a ground for informing the judicial consideration of when
to apply the presumption and when to invoke the qualification.
Finally, we offer some empirical analysis of some of the law’s
proxies for sophistication, finding that education and consumer
experience (but not income, age, or gender) are meaningful
predictors of consumer care.
II. SOPHISTICATION AND “GAP-BRIDGING”
AS ELEMENTS OF THE MULTIFACTOR TEST
FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Although the likelihood of confusion tests applied in the
various federal circuits share certain factors in common, there is
“excessive intercircuit variation” in the content of the multifactor
tests and even more variation in the application and relative

8. Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1228 (2d Cir.
1987).
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significance of those factors.9 In all federal circuits, four factors are
considered relevant: the similarity of the parties’ trademarks, the
competitive proximity of their products or services, the existence of
“actual confusion,” and the strength of the senior trademark.10
Other factors considered in some (but not all) circuits include the
defendant’s intent in adopting the junior trademark, the relative
“sophistication” of the relevant consumers, the similarity of the
parties’ marketing and sales channels, and the likelihood that the
parties will “bridge the gap” to come into closer competition in the
future.11
Our focus here is on the “sophistication” and “bridging the
gap” factors. The paragraphs below summarize the courts’
treatment—and extensive disagreement—about the relevance and
nature of these factors. The case law is examined in the context of
a hypothetical that is continued in the theoretical and empirical
sections below. Under the hypothetical, a notebook computer is
marketed under the CADILLAC brand name. The junior user has
no affiliation with General Motors (GM), the owner of the
CADILLAC brand of automobiles. And although GM has not
licensed the CADILLAC mark for use in the computer market and
has no plans to do so, our hypothetical assumes that one of GM’s
competitors (Mercedes-Benz) has introduced a line of officially
licensed notebook computers.
The question evaluated throughout this article—at a doctrinal,
theoretical, and empirical level—is whether consumer confusion is
likely under these circumstances. This section focuses on the
doctrinal question: whether under the various formulations of the
multifactor test for trademark infringement GM is likely to
succeed in establishing a likelihood of confusion. The short answer
is that it depends in large part on where the case is pending
because different circuits have adopted different formulations of
the “sophistication” and “bridging the gap” factors that may
produce drastically different outcomes under the hypothetical
facts.
A. Consumer Sophistication12
The consumer sophistication factor encompasses several
considerations that are thought by the courts to affect the
attention consumers may pay to their purchases. In circuits that

9. Beebe, supra note 1, at 1583-90.
10. Id. at 1589.
11. Id. at 1590.
12. The discussion in this section borrows extensively—and without further citation—
from the introductory sections of our article analyzing the sophistication case law under a
consumer psychology model. See Lee et al., supra note 6, at 575 (2008).
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consider this factor, the courts generally hold that if a consumer
can be expected to exercise a high degree of care, he will be less
likely to be confused about any connection between a senior and
junior trademark.13 A sophisticated consumer is expected to act not
on “impulse,” but on the basis of “a careful consideration of the
reliability and dependability of the manufacturer and seller of the
product.”14 In other words, a sophisticated consumer is one who is
apt to spend more time, attention, or care in making a purchasing
decision—and who is thus generally deemed less likely to be
confused as to the source or sponsorship of the trademarked
products he buys.15 Unsophisticated consumers, by contrast, are
“the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearance
and general impressions.”16 The prototypical unsophisticated
consumer is the man walking the supermarket aisle who
“undergo[es] . . . an experience not unlike that of hypnosis,”17 in
which purchases are made impulsively and thoughtlessly.
A key threshold question in the case law is how to distinguish
the careful and sophisticated consumer from the unthinking and
credulous one. Although the courts have not attempted to
articulate any comprehensive theoretical framework for assessing
consumer propensities toward care, a few consistent themes have
emerged in the case law.18 The principal strands of analysis in the
13. Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002).
14. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206 (1st
Cir. 1983).
15. Search sophistication, as recently formulated by Barton Beebe, “refers to the
consumer’s capacity to distinguish between similar trademark uses (i.e., to avoid identity
confusion), and furthermore, to recognize that such uses designate different sources (i.e., to
avoid inferential confusion).” Beebe, supra note 1, at 2035. This is the “sophistication” the
law is generally concerned with as a factor relevant to the likelihood of confusion; it is
distinct from “persuasion sophistication,” a concept Beebe describes as referring “to a
consumer’s opportunity to resist commercial persuasion attempts”—to “‘cope’ with
marketplace persuasion” aimed at “delud[ing]” the consumer into purchasing a product or
service on the basis of the “selling power” or “differential distinctiveness” of a trademark. Id.
at 2047-50.
16. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
17. Pikle-Rite Co. v. Chicago Pickle Co., 171 F. Supp. 671, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
18. Trademark law treatises provide a general overview of the case law addressing this
factor, but not any comprehensive theoretical analysis. See 2 Anne Gilson LaLonde,
Trademark Protection and Practice § 5.08 (asserting that “the courts classify purchasers
into two types, ordinary purchasers and discriminating purchasers,” that the former have
“no special training or experience,” and that the latter have either “special training” or
“purchase costly products”); 3A Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 21:10 (May 2003) [hereinafter Callmann]
(stating that the degree of consumer care “will differ according to the ‘character of the
article, the use to which it is put, the kind of people who ask for it, and the manner in which
it is ordered’”); 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§§ 23:95-23:102 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter McCarthy] (identifying price, class of purchasers,
and other factors relevant to the degree of consumer sophistication).
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case law include the assertion that consumer care or sophistication
correlates positively with price,19 length and complexity of the
purchase transaction,20 infrequency of purchase,21 and education,
age, and income22; and the notions that professional buyers,23 avid
hobbyists,24 and (sometimes) women25 are more sophisticated.
The perceived degree of sophistication can have a significant
effect on the degree of protection afforded to a trademark holder.
Some courts have gone so far as to suggest that a high degree of
consumer sophistication in a target market may trump all other
factors, virtually eliminating the likelihood of consumer confusion
in the case of a professional or highly sophisticated buyer.26 Other
courts are more measured in their assessment of the relative
significance of this factor, suggesting that its “import” is “small
indeed” (at least in cases where the junior and senior trademarks
are “identical”).27
19. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 284 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citing 3 McCarthy, supra note 18, § 23:95).
20. See Lee et al., supra note 6, at 609.
21. Compare Black & Decker, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 632 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D.
Conn. 1986) (finding that consumers of hand-held vacuum cleaners are relatively
sophisticated in that such a “product is not the kind of household item that one purchases
frequently, but rather is an item that the purchaser expects will last for a lengthy duration
and therefore would require care in its purchase”), with Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas
Enter., Ltd., 774 F.2d 1144, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that consumers of disposable
diapers exhibit a “‘lesser standard of purchasing care’” given that such products “are
relatively inexpensive and frequently replaceable”), and K-Swiss, Inc. v. USA AISIQI Shoes,
Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Athletic shoes are common consumer
items and often are purchased several times a year. A reasonable consumer, therefore, is
unlikely to exercise a high degree of care in selecting shoes.”).
22. See Lee et al., supra note 6, at 627.
23. See, e.g., Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Rite Aid Corp., 210 U.S.P.Q.2d 2024, 2029
(W.D.N.Y. 1991), modified, 1992 WL 125561 (W.D.N.Y. May 29, 1992), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1048
(2d Cir. 1992) (declaring that business executives are simply more sophisticated in many
areas); HQ Network Sys. v. Executive Headquarters, 755 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (D. Mass.
1991) (holding that business executives are generally more sophisticated in all areas).
24. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1277-78
(D. Or. 2001) (holding that hobbyists are grouped into the category of “expert” buyers for
sophistication purposes).
25. See Lee et al., supra note 6, at 637.
26. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the “relative sophistication of the market may trump the presence or absence of any other
factor”). See also 3A Callmann, supra note 18, § 21:12, at 21-121 (stating that a professional
or sophisticated buyer’s “detailed knowledge of the product and careful examination with
respect to its technical requirements are factors of greater significance than the trademarks
used”).
27. Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097, 1101 (2d Cir.
1969). See also Habitat Design Holdings Ltd. v. Habitat, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 327, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating that “[t]he Second Circuit has noted that the importance of this
criterion is minimal where the marks in question are identical”). Professor Beebe’s empirical
study found that “across the 292 opinions sampled from circuits that explicitly consider this
[sophistication] factor, the factor was found to disfavor a likelihood of confusion (that is,
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Courts
and
commentators
reflexively—and
almost
unanimously—conclude that sophistication in any of its various
forms is negatively correlated with the likelihood of confusion.28
The standard explanation is that confusion is a state of error or
mistake, and that a consumer who is more sophisticated (in the
sense of spending more time or cognitive energy on the purchase or
being more highly motivated to focus on the purchase) is more
likely to dispel that error than one who is less sophisticated.
Potential consumers of CADILLAC notebook computers would
probably be deemed sophisticated. Because notebook computers
are relatively high-priced and are generally purchased by more
highly educated consumers, the courts probably would expect
consumers of such items to exercise a high degree of care in the
purchase process. Thus, most courts would find the sophistication
factor to cut against the likelihood of confusion.
That is by no means a foregone conclusion, however. Not all
courts consider consumer sophistication in their multifactored
evaluation of the likelihood of confusion.29 And even where this
factor is considered, there is a debate in the case law about the
fundamental question of which way sophistication cuts. Sometimes
the courts turn the usual presumption upside down, asserting that
sophisticated consumers are more likely to be confused.
The Second Circuit is the principal judicial source of the view
that it may be “a sophisticated . . . consumer who is most likely” to
be confused by a junior use of a trademark that is similar to a
senior mark.30 In the Lois Sportswear case, for example, that court
found a likelihood of confusion arising out of the defendant’s use of
a stitching pattern on the back pocket of the defendant’s jeans that
was “nearly identical” to that long used by the plaintiff Levi
Strauss & Co.31 In so doing, the court asserted that “[p]resumably
it is . . . sophisticated jeans buyers who pay the most attention to
back pocket stitching patterns,” and thus that such consumers are
most likely to “assume that the presence of [Levi’s] trademark

consumers were seen as sufficiently sophisticated not to be confused) 39% of the time and to
favor a likelihood of confusion [because consumers were unsophisticated] 28% of the time.”
Beebe, supra note 1, at 1643. Those data, however, say very little about the relative
significance of the sophistication factor as compared to other factors. Our analysis does not
offer any empirical answer to this important question, but we do offer some theoretical
analysis in Part III.B., below.
28. See the accompanying text at notes 13-17, supra.
29. Beebe, supra note 1, at 1591, Table 1 (noting that the tests from the Fourth, Fifth,
and Eleventh Circuits do not encompass this factor).
30. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.
1986).
31. Id.
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stitching pattern on [defendant Lois Sportswear’s] jeans indicates
some sort of association between the two manufacturers.”32
Yet despite the occasional reference to this contrary proviso,
the courts have made little or no attempt to explain when a finding
of sophistication will have its usual effect of reducing the
likelihood of confusion and when such a finding might have the
opposite effect. The result is a confusing patchwork of cases in
which most courts proclaim the orthodox view that sophistication
decreases the risk of confusion while others rather inexplicably
state that the opposite is true.
In Arrow Fastener Co. v. The Stanley Works, for example, the
plaintiff Arrow asserted that defendant Stanley’s use of “T50” as
part of the model number for one of its pneumatic staplers
infringed its T-50 trademark for hand-operated staple guns,
arguing that “knowledgeable purchasers . . . are precisely the
individuals who would be familiar with T-50 . . . and seek products
from the same source.”33 The Second Circuit acknowledged the
“support in the case law” for sometimes treating sophistication as
a plus-factor for confusion, but ultimately rejected it—without any
theoretical explanation for its decision and on the sole basis of its
assertion that a purchaser in the “‘fairly detailed purchasing
process’ for the purchase of a Stanley pneumatic stapler” can be
expected to “possess a high level of knowledge” and is “not likely to
be confused by the use of ‘T50’ in the product’s model number.”34
Thus, the prevailing view in the Second Circuit is that
“[s]ophistication usually militates against a finding of a likelihood
of confusion, though it might on occasion increase the likelihood of
confusion, depending upon the circumstances of the market and
the products.”35 The problem is that no one has articulated just
what “circumstances” are relevant to this important distinction. In
short, the notion of sophistication as enhancing the likelihood of

32. Id. (also concluding that “in the post-sale context, the sophisticated buyer is more
likely to be affected by the sight of appellee’s stitching pattern on appellants’ jeans and,
consequently, to transfer goodwill”). See also Philip Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F.
Supp. 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The Philip Morris case involved a claim that the
defendant’s GUNSMOKE cigarettes had adopted a trade dress similar to that used by the
plaintiff’s MARLBORO brand. Noting “that a very large number of regular consumers view
the MARLBORO trade dress—the cowboy transformed into the ‘Marlboro Man’ inhabiting
‘Marlboro Country’—with sufficient approval to influence their purchasing decisions,” the
court concluded that if “that sort of consumer decision making [is] ‘sophisticated,’ then it is a
form of sophistication that actually increases the likelihood that these consumers would be
confused by GUNSMOKE’s similar trade dress.” Id.
33. 59 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 1995).
34. Id.
35. Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1228 (2d Cir.
1987).
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confusion in some circumstances is oft cited,36 seldom actually
applied,37 and never coherently explained.
Thus, without some further analysis, it is hard to offer a
confident prediction about the likely impact of the consumer
sophistication factor in the hypothetical CADILLAC notebook
computer case. This is a good example of a case where trademark
doctrine is, “in the hands of an experienced judge or litigator,
notoriously pliable.”38
B. The Likelihood of “Bridging the Gap”
The likelihood of “bridging the gap” is a factor considered by
some courts in cases where the junior and senior markets are not
closely proximate. In the circuits that consider this factor, the idea
is that although the junior user’s market may be at some
competitive distance from the senior trademark holder’s market,
that “gap” may be bridged at some point in the future. Thus,
continuing the example introduced above, if GM is deemed likely
to bridge the gap from the automobile market to the notebook
computer market, some courts would conclude that the likelihood
of confusion is increased.
Only five of the thirteen federal circuits expressly consider the
likelihood of “bridging the gap” as a factor in the likelihood of
confusion calculus.39 Thus, in most circuits, the courts presumably
would deem the lack of proximity between the automobile and
notebook computer markets to be a significant factor militating
against the likelihood of consumer confusion—without regard to

36. Recent citations of the principle include: Fibermark v. Brownsville Specialty Paper
Prods., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14019, No. 7:02-CV-0517, at *18, n. 5 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)
(explaining that “[t]he Second Circuit does not blindly apply the sophistication factor in the
likelihood of confusion analysis” and that “it recognizes that sophistication ‘might on
occasion increase the likelihood of confusion, depending upon the circumstances of the
market and the products,” but failing to identify the relevant “circumstances”); Cartier v.
Samo’s Sons, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23395, No. 04 Civ. 2268, *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(indicating that “[i]n certain contexts, the sophistication of the buyer ‘might not be
determinative’ because ‘it is sophisticated buyers . . . who pay the most attention’ to certain
aspects of a luxury product,” but never reaching the question of whether that principle
applied to the plaintiff’s claim for trade dress infringement of its watch design); MB Fin.
Bank v. MB Real Estate Serv., LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10578 No. 02 C 5929, at *48-49
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting Second Circuit authority holding that sometimes “sophistication will
only lead to more confusion,” criticizing the plaintiff for “turning the sophistication
argument on its head” “without any evidentiary support,” but failing to explain when
sophistication may have that effect or what sort of evidence the plaintiff should have
presented).
37. To our knowledge, the only two cases that have actually applied the doctrine are
Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 875, and Philip Morris, 879 F. Supp. at 388.
38. Beebe, supra note 1, at 1583-84.
39. Id. at 1591, Table 1.
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any likelihood that GM might be thought likely to “bridge the gap”
into the computer market.
Even in circuits that consider this factor, there is an important
rift as to the nature of proof required to establish that a “gapbridging” extension is likely. One line of the cases takes a
managerial perspective, requiring proof of concrete, material plans
for extension; another takes a consumer’s perspective, evaluating
the likelihood of extension from the standpoint of a reasonable
consumer.40
The former set of cases deems the potential for extension
“unpersuasive unless plaintiff [can] prove a strong likelihood that
it would soon bridge the gap by expanding into the defendant’s
product market.”41 Under this line of cases, the existence of brand
extension by a plaintiff’s competitors is not itself a consideration
that enhances the likelihood of confusion. Thus, in Horn’s, Inc. v.
Sanofi Beaute, Inc.,42 a New York district court found insufficient
evidence of a likelihood that a fashion industry magazine publisher
would “bridge the gap” to the perfume market occupied by the
plaintiff. The court acknowledged that “companies having an
expertise in fashion often market perfumes”—to the degree that
“[o]ne is hard-pressed to think of a fashion designer whose name is
not linked to a perfume.”43 Yet the court found that the “bridging
the gap” factor “militates against finding a likelihood of confusion,”
because “none of [plaintiff’s] plans to develop and market a
fragrance is concrete, nor has any materialized.”44

40. See 3A Callmann, supra note 18, § 21:50 (citing cases and noting that some courts
require proof of “a ‘strong possibility’ that one party will expand its business to compete
with the other as a basis for inferring a likelihood of confusion”).
41. 3 McCarthy, supra note 18, § 24:17 (citing Emerson Elec. Mfg. co. v. Emerson Radio
& Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116
F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940); California Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971
(7th Cir. 1947); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Cascade Coach Co., 168 U.S.P.Q. 795 (T.T.A.B.
1970); Avon Shoe Corp. v. David Crystal, Inc. 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960)).
42. 963 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
43. Id. at 325 (noting that “Calvin Klein, Donna Karan and Giorgio Armani quickly
come to mind”).
44. Id. Compare Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1450-51
(S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding that the “line of expansion” factor “militates against a finding of a
likelihood of confusion” between the plaintiff’s HEARTWISE mark for “breakfast meat
substitute products” and the defendant’s HEARTWISE breakfast cereal where the plaintiff
had failed to “come forward with a signed purchase agreement” or any other “firm evidence”
of expansion, and despite the relatedness of the parties’ goods and the plaintiff’s intent to
purchase a “company making a ready-to-eat cereal”).
The Horn court cited Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1991), in support of its requirement of “concrete” proof, but the Lang case is distinguishable
on a ground that actually undermines the Horn court’s rejection of the “brand extension”
concept. In Lang, the Second Circuit quoted the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
for the proposition that a plaintiff’s intent to expand “‘does not affect’” the likelihood of
confusion “‘unless known by prospective purchasers.’” Id. at 582 (citing Restatement (Third)
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The latter, contrary set of cases is exemplified by the Third
Circuit’s decision in Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries,
Inc.45 In Fisons, the plaintiff, which marketed peat moss under the
trademark FAIRWAY, brought trademark infringement claims
arising out of the defendant’s use of the FAIRWAY GREEN mark
on fertilizer. In finding the “extension” factor to weigh in favor of a
likelihood of confusion, the court adopted the consumer
perspective. It noted the evidence in the record that “the market
leader” and “three other lawn and garden companies . . . sell both
peat moss and fertilizer under the same brand name.”46 Thus,
because “the public is used to seeing both fertilizer and peat moss
marketed under the same name by the same company,” the court
held that the “extension” factor “weighed heavily in plaintiff’s
favor.”47
The choice between the managerial and consumer perspectives
could make a big difference to the outcome of our CADILLAC
computer case. Under the Horn’s managerial approach, GM’s lack
of any “plans to develop and market” a notebook computer would
turn this factor in the junior user’s favor, and the significant gap
between cars and computers might be enough to tip the scales
against GM. Yet the consumer approach would allow GM to turn
the factor in its favor, by demonstrating that after the
MERCEDES-BENZ extension into the computer market the public
has become “used to seeing” the convergence of these two markets.
Thus, as with the sophistication factor, it is hard to make a
confident prediction as to how the “bridging the gap” factor might
cut in our hypothetical case. The case law itself yields no clear
answers; the law is in dire need of a clear theory and some
empirical analysis.

of Unfair Competition § 21 reporter’s note at 21 (1995)) (emphasis in Lang). The negative
implication is significant: if prospective purchasers are aware of the likelihood of expansion,
there may be an impact on the likelihood of confusion even in the absence of any “concrete”
plans by the plaintiff.
45. 30 F.3d 466 (3d Cir. 1994).
46. Id. at 480.
47. Id. at 480-81. The Fisons court also noted that the plaintiff had presented evidence
of its own “planned expansion,” but its analysis accorded independent significance to
evidence of brand extension. Id. See also Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imp. Ltd., 544 F.2d
1167, 1174-75 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that because many high-fashion designers had
expanded into the cosmetics and fragrance fields, it was likely that consumers would think
that the plaintiff, a high-fashion designer, had also done so); Planetary Motion, Inc. v.
Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the fact that other
companies had products in the fields of email software and email service made it likely that
consumers would be confused by two different companies using the same trademark in the
two fields); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Envtl. Chem., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(stating that the likelihood of confusion in the use of the same trademark on both a car
dealership and an auto body shop was high because other dealerships often had auto body
shops).
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III. A CONSMER PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE ON
SOPHISTICATION AND “GAP-BRIDGING”

Although the case law is mostly bereft of any careful
theoretical explanation of the significance of the sophistication and
“gap-bridging” factors in the likelihood of confusion calculus, there
is a rich body of consumer psychology literature that contains the
building blocks for such an explanation. In the paragraphs below,
we use that literature to develop models of consumer cognition
that can be used to evaluate the proper role of these two factors.
First, in modeling the role of consumer sophistication, we
identify two general antecedents to the exercise of consumer care:
a sufficient level of “motivation” for care and an adequate “ability”
to be careful. We develop these antecedents to explain the usual
presumption that careful consumers are less likely to be confused,
and also to identify circumstances in which the opposite result
may occur.
Second, in modeling the relevance of “gap-bridging,” we look to
the theory of schemas, which are structures in a consumer’s longterm memory that describe categories of objects. We develop the
schema model to explain why the prospects for “bridging the gap”
may be relevant to the likelihood of confusion, and to take sides in
the debate over whether this factor should be evaluated under a
managerial or consumer approach.
We also bring these models together to evaluate the likelihood
of confusion (under the “sophistication” and “bridging the gap”
factors in particular) in our CADILLAC computer case. Ultimately,
we explain the basis for our hypotheses (measured empirically in
Part IV. below): (1) that “gap-bridging” by a competitor of the
senior trademark holder into the junior user’s market will increase
the likelihood of confusion; and (2) that sophisticated consumers
are more likely to be confused in the face of expansion by a
competitor.
A. A Consumer Psychology Model of Sophistication48
In the marketplace, trademarks (referred to as “brands” in the
marketing and consumer behavior literature) are helpful to
consumers—not only by indicating the product’s source but also by
giving consumers a quick-and-dirty indicator of a variety of
product attributes and quality. After identifying the brand, the
consumer is able to make a wide variety of inferences regarding
the product without laborious investigation. For example, a
consumer who identifies a notebook computer as being a DELL

48. For a fuller description of this model, see Lee et al., supra note 6, at 583.
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brand product may forego an in-depth analysis of each attribute of
the product and may infer a certain level of quality.
Obviously, before consumers can enjoy the benefit of using a
brand name as a short-cut indicator of quality, consumers must
identify the brand. The process undertaken by consumers to
recognize and identify the brand has been called the “sourceidentification judgment.”49 Because brands are so useful as
indicators of quality, consumers often perform a sourceidentification judgment when they consider products.50
However, this is not to suggest that consumers always perform
the source-identification judgment in a thorough and vigilant way.
The source-identification judgment is a cognitive process.
Consumers must gather information that is potentially relevant to
the judgment (e.g., trade dress, brand name, etc.); they must
consider and comprehend the information; and they must in turn
integrate it into a single source-identification judgment. One of the
main tenets of the consumer behavior literature is that cognitive
processes such as these require cognitive effort. Just as physical
activity (e.g., climbing stairs) requires physical effort, so mental
activity (e.g., searching the environment for information) requires
cognitive effort. Thus, a consumer might expend the cognitive
effort necessary to perform the source-identification judgment in a
thorough and vigilant manner. Alternatively, a consumer might
expend less cognitive effort, yielding a haphazard and thoughtless
source-identification judgment. Such a judgment would be
characterized by gathering inadequate environmental information,
not attempt to comprehend information that is challenging, and
integrating the information in a careless and offhand way.
It should be noted that this description of the cognitive effort
that is expended by consumers during the source-identification
judgment is consistent with the law’s description of a “degree of
care” being exhibited by consumers in the context of source
confusion. Courts have sometimes referred to consumers exerting a
“high degree of care”; such consumers can be more thoroughly
described as exerting the cognitive effort necessary to make the
source-identification judgment in a vigilant and thoughtful way.
Similarly, courts have sometimes referred to consumers who exert
a “low degree of care.” Such consumers are those who fail to exert
sufficient cognitive effort during the source-identification
judgment.

49. Id.
50. Id.
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1. Motivation and Ability as Minus Factors

The consumer psychology literature has identified two
principal antecedents to an individual consumer’s exertion of
cognitive effort. The first broad category of antecedents relates to
the individual’s motivation to expend cognitive effort. Just as
people are typically reluctant to exert physical effort (e.g., people
using escalators instead of climbing stairs) but will do so if they
are sufficiently motivated, consumers will exert cognitive effort
only if they are sufficiently motivated. In effect, consumers act as
cognitive misers51 who exert cognitive effort only when they have
sufficient incentive to do so.52
Two principal sources of motivation are identified in the
literature: personal involvement (both situational and enduring)
and intrapersonal traits. The perception of personal relevance or
salience in a product or service offering is the essential
characteristic of a consumer’s personal involvement.53 Motivation
to engage in extended cognition can also emerge from the
personality and intrapersonal traits that are part of a consumer’s
makeup.
The second broad category of antecedents is the individual’s
ability to exert cognitive effort. Just as people may be inhibited in
their ability to perform a physical task (e.g., the box is too heavy to
lift or a person has an injured back that inhibits the ability to lift
it), a wide variety of factors can restrict a consumer’s ability to
exert cognitive effort as they perform the source-identification
judgment.
A customer thus comes to a purchase situation with
intrapersonal traits that can either enable or inhibit his ability to
process information. For example, some consumers are simply

51. See Michael J. Houston et al., Picture-Word Consistency and the Elaborative
Processing of Advertisements, 24 J. Marketing Res. 359 (1987) (showing the role of
elaborative processing during advertising exposure). See generally Alice H. Eagly & Shelly
Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 The Handbook of Social Psychology (Daniel
Todd Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1993); James M. Olson & Mark P. Zanna, Attitudes and
Attitude Change, 44 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 117 (1993).
52. A pejorative reading (i.e., consumers are cognitively lazy and therefore corrupt and
deficient) is unnecessary. By expending physical effort only when motivated to do so,
humans conserve energy and thereby hold in reserve the energy to act when necessary. An
individual who continually expends maximum physical effort at every possible opportunity
would expend mostly unnecessary effort and would probably be unable to survive. The same
can be said for cognitive effort; if the many judgments an individual makes during a typical
day were made with maximum vigilance and thoroughness, the individual would be unable
to function effectively.
53. Richard L. Celsi & Jerry C. Olson, The Role of Involvement in Attention and
Comprehension Processes, 15 J. Consumer Res. 210, 211 (1988).
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faster or more capable processors than others.54 This ability
enables such consumers to process more information and with a
greater attention to detail. Also, some consumers have previous
experience with the product or product category that is facilitative
of extended cognition. With past experience, knowledge structures
develop in memory that lay the foundation for expertise. These
extended knowledge structures are then available to the consumer
when exerting cognitive effort as part of mental processes.55 These
consumer experts can employ these memory structures to compare,
contrast, counter-argue, confirm, integrate, and, in other ways,
elaborate upon during the consumer decision-making process.56
Consumer behavior studies suggest that overall intelligence
and education are both directly related to a person’s ability to
exercise consumer care. Higher levels of intelligence will endow
the consumer with greater processing capacity.57 Further, much
like an upgrade in hardware processing power, greater educational
attainment is shown to advance intelligence by improving
processing strategies, problem-solving skills, and the ability to
parse and comprehend complex information.58
In addition to a consumer’s processing capacity, extensive
knowledge of a particular product or product category (i.e., greater
consumer expertise59) also facilitates deeper and more efficient
cognitive processing.60 In fact, having previous experience with
and knowledge of a product and its product category facilitates the
acquisition of new information regarding that product and
category, while also increasing the efficiency61 and accuracy62 of
the information search.

54. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Separate or Equal?: Bimodal Notions of Persuasion and a
Single Process “Unimodel,” in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 293, 298-99
(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
55. Id. at 298.
56. Id.
57. See Rolph E. Anderson & Marvin A. Jolson, Technical Wording in Advertising:
Implications for Market Segmentation, 44 J. Mktg. 57, 63-64 (1980).
58. See Nancy Lampert, Critical Thinking Dispositions
Undergraduate Education, 56 J. Gen. Educ., 17, 17-18 (2007).

as

an

Outcome

of

59. Joseph W. Alba & J. Wesley Hutchinson, Dimensions of Consumer Expertise, 13 J.
Consumer Res. 411, 411 (1987).
60. Durairaj Maheswaran & Brian Sternthal, The Effects of Knowledge, Motivation,
and Type of Message on Ad Processing and Product Judgments, 17 J. Consumer Res. 66, 66
(1990).
61. See Merrie Brucks, The Effects of Product Class Knowledge on Information Search
Behavior, 12 J. Consumer Res. 1, 1-16 (1985); Jacoby, supra note 5, at 1023-28.
62. See Cynthia Huffman & Michael J. Houston, Goal-Oriented Experiences and the
Development of Knowledge, 20 J. Consumer Res. 190, 190-207 (1993).
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Individuals develop more elaborate knowledge structures
around what they experience more frequently.63 Thus, consumers
who purchase the same product frequently have greater knowledge
in that category, which amounts to an increase in ability.
Similarly, consumers exposed to repeated advertising are more
likely to develop richer product knowledge structures that are
facilitative of consumer care.64
Motivation and ability alone are each necessary but
insufficient conditions for an individual to exert cognitive effort
and thus be “sophisticated” in a legal sense. That is, if either
motivation or ability is lacking, the individual will exert little
cognitive effort while performing the source-identification task.
Thus, the consumer behavior literature suggests that if a
consumer is to perform the source-identification judgment in a
meticulous and vigilant manner, she must be sufficiently
motivated and also able to exert the cognitive effort necessary to
perform such a judgment. In contrast, if an individual lacks either
motivation or ability to expend cognitive effort while making the
source-identification judgment, she will perform the task in a
haphazard and offhand manner, resulting in an increased
likelihood of confusion.
Much of the case law concerning consumer sophistication can
be understood in light of this model.65 When courts deem a group
of consumers to be sophisticated, they are often suggesting that
some aspect of the purchase process triggers a high level of
situational motivation or that the relevant consumers are
intrinsically motivated to think deeply about the product at hand.
At other times, the courts focus on traits of the relevant customers
that are perceived to be related to consumers’ ability to engage in
extended cognition and exercise a high degree of care when finding
consumers to be sophisticated. Unsophisticated consumers, by
contrast, are those that either lack such motivation or that are
subject to some situational or systemic constraint on their ability
to exert cognitive effort.
This model explains why we should generally expect so-called
sophisticated consumers to be less susceptible to confusion.
Consumers with greater ability (whether due to situational or
intrapersonal factors) are better able to exert more cognitive effort
and are better enabled to perform the source-identification
judgment (unless they have limited motivation to do so), and thus
will be less likely to be confused.
63. C. Whan Park et al., Consumer Knowledge Assessment, 21 J. Consumer Res. 71
(1994).
64. See Alba & Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 415-17.
65. For an extensive discussion of the cases and a more complete elaboration of the
model, see Lee et al., supra note 6, at 589.
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2. Motivation and Ability, as Plus Factors
What of the opposite proviso in the case law—that sometimes
sophisticated consumers are more likely to be confused? Our model
also provides a basis for understanding why (and when) that
proviso might hold. Sophistication will have its anticipated effect
of diminishing the likelihood of confusion if and only if the
consumer’s exercise of care can be expected to reveal a distinction
between the senior and junior sources. That may not happen if, for
example, the junior mark is identical to the senior one and the
consumer lacks adequate motivation to pursue an inspection
beyond a simple comparison of the junior and senior labels.
This explains why sophisticated consumers may not be less
likely to be confused. But why would they be even more likely? The
answer is that in some circumstances, a consumer with a greater
ability to process carefully and deeply will be more likely to
perceive a false connection between the senior and junior
trademarks. A more able and careful consumer, for example, might
be expected to be more likely to perceive an initial connection
between CADILLAC automobiles and a CADILLAC brand
notebook computer because they think more deeply than their less
capable (as to innate ability, educational attainment or expertise
in the product category) counterparts. If careful thought cues a
false connection that might not occur to less “sophisticated”
consumers, and the exercise of consumer care cannot be expected
to dispel that connection in the face of an apparently identical
junior use,66 the “sophisticated” consumer is the one that may be
most likely to be confused.
B. “Gap-Bridging”: Categorization and Schema Theory
A further understanding of the cognitive processes that
underlie the source-identification judgment can be found in
schema theory.67 A schema is a structure in the consumer’s longterm memory that describes a category of objects. Included with
the schema may be a wide variety of memory associations
developed through experience such as specific examples of category
members, a representation of a prototypical (average or ideal)
category member, the attributes necessary for category
membership, optional attributes, a sense of how common each

66. See, e.g., In re New Archery Prods. Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q. 670 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (finding
that purchasers of fishing and hunting equipment are apt to be discriminating purchasers,
but nevertheless could be confused as to the connection between RAZORBACK 5 as a mark
for arrowheads and RAZORBACK for fishing lures).
67. For detailed reviews, see David J. Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping (2004)
and also David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W. Sherman, Stereotypes, in Handbook of Social
Cognition, Vol. 2 1-68 (Robert S. Wyer & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1994).
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attribute is among category members, and a set of hypotheses
about what attributes typically go together among members of the
category.68 Schemas are hierarchical69 in the sense that most
schemas have superordinate categories (e.g., the consumer may
classify the CADILLAC MOTORS schema as a member of the
LUXURY VEHICLE schema) and subordinate categories (e.g., the
consumer may be aware of many models of CADILLAC cars and
trucks and consider them all to be subtypes within the CADILLAC
MOTORS schema).
From a schema theory perspective, the cognitive process
undertaken by a consumer when she encounters a product and
identifies its brand (i.e., identifies the product’s source) can be
described as a categorization process. Categorizing a stimulus as
an instance of a particular memory schema requires a number of
steps.70 First, the consumer uses attributes of the stimulus to
identify a potential schema, thereby activating the schema in
memory.71 Next, the consumer evaluates the likelihood that the
stimulus is an instance of the activated schema.72 This evaluation
requires a comparison between the stimulus and expectations for
category members as implied by the schema. If no mismatches are
found between the stimulus and the schema, the consumer will
categorize the stimulus as an instance of the activated category.
For example, if a consumer encounters a large car with the word
“Cadillac” and the Cadillac logo on the vehicle’s front grill, he
might activate his CADILLAC MOTORS schema, would find no
mismatches between the stimulus and the attributes implied by
the schema and would therefore categorize the vehicle as an
instance of the CADILLAC MOTORS schema. Such a consumer
might say, “That car is a Cadillac.” From a legal perspective, such
a categorization constitutes an identification of the product’s
source.
68. Mita Sujan, Consumer Knowledge: Effects on Evaluation Strategies Mediating
Consumer Judgments, 12 J. of Consumer Res. 31-46 (1985).
69. David E. Rumelhart & Andrew Ortony, The Representation of Knowledge in
Memory, in Schooling and the Acquisition of Knowledge 99-135 (Richard C. Anderson, Rand
J. Shapiro & William E. Montague eds., 1977); Ulrich Neisser, Cognition and Reality (1976);
Barbara Loken & James Ward, Alternative Approaches to Understanding the Determinants
of Typicality, 17 J. of Consumer Res. 111-26 (1990).
70. For a detailed review, see Joel B. Cohen & Kunal Basu, Alternative Models of
Categorization: Toward a Contingent Processing Framework, 13 J. of Consumer Res. 455-72
(1987).
71. C. Page Moreau, Arthur B. Markman & Donald R. Lehmann, “What Is It?”
Categorization Flexibility and Consumers’ Responses to Really New Products, 27 J. of
Consumer Res. 489-98 (2001).
72. Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, From
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on
Attention and Interpretation, in 23 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 1-74 (Mark
P. Zanna ed., 1990).
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If there are mismatches (i.e., there is incongruity) between the
stimulus and the activated schema, the categorization effort may
be rejected73 and the consumer may search his or her memory for
another schema to activate and consider.74 Alternatively, the
consumer may accept the categorization by creating a new subtype
within the schema.75 For example, if a consumer were to encounter
a notebook computer labeled with the word “Cadillac,” he or she
might find a notebook computer to be incongruous with the
CADILLAC MOTORS schema. If the consumer encountered
enough information76 to convince him or her that the notebook is,
indeed, manufactured or sponsored by the automobile
manufacturer (e.g., an ad for the notebook computer uses the
CADILLAC logotype and contains photographs of the notebook
computer sitting in or on a CADILLAC car), the consumer may
accept notebook computers as a new kind of CADILLAC product.
In other words, the consumer may update his or her CADILLAC
MOTORS schema to include CADILLAC NOTEBOOK
COMPUTERS as a new subtype. Subtyping is a form of
categorization,77 so subtyping constitutes an identification of the
product’s source from a legal perspective. Continuing the example,
by accepting CADILLAC NOTEBOOK COMPUTERS as a subtype
of CADILLAC, the consumer has identified CADILLAC MOTORS
as the source or sponsor of the laptop computer.
A key question, therefore, is under what conditions will a
person subtype within the schema rather than reject the
categorization and search for a new schema to consider? Findings
in the literature78 suggest that the extent of incongruity between
the stimulus and the activated schema is one determinant.
Subtyping is more likely for moderate incongruity than for severe
incongruity. The rationale for this effect offered in theoretical
models79 is that severely incongruous stimuli are not seen as
plausible subtypes. For example, most consumers might find a
73. Susan T. Fiske & Mark A. Pavelchak, Category Based versus Piecemeal Based
Affective Responses, Developments in Schema-Triggered Affect, in Handbook of Motivation
and Cognition: Foundation of Social Behaviour 168-203 (Richard M. Sorrentino & Edward
Tory Higgins eds., 1986).
74. See Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 72.
75. Renee Weber and Jennifer Crocker, Cognitive Processes in the Revision of
Stereotypic Beliefs 45 J. of Personality and Social Psychology 961-77 (1983); Mita Sujan &
James R. Bettman, The Effects of Brand Positioning Strategies on Consumers’ Brand and
Category Perceptions: Some Insights from Schema Research, 26 J. of Mktg. Res. 454-67
(1989).
76. See Fiske & Pavelchak, supra note 73.
77. Zeynep Gürhan-Canli & Durairaj Maheswaran, The Effects of Extensions on Brand
Name Dilution and Enhancement, 35 J. of Mktg. Res. 1-19 (1998).
78. See id. and Sujan & Bettman, supra note 75.
79. See Fiske & Pavelchak, supra note 73.
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CADILLAC VAN to be only moderately incongruent with their
CADILLAC MOTORS schema, so upon seeing an advertisement
for such a van, most consumers might find such a subtype to be
plausible and would update their CADILLAC MOTORS schema to
include a CADILLAC VAN subtype. In contrast, CADILLAC brand
notebook computers might be seen as severely incongruent.
Because a CADILLAC NOTEBOOK COMPUTER schema would be
less plausible, such consumers would be less likely to categorize
the notebook computer as a subtype of the CADILLAC MOTORS
schema and thus reject it as emanating from CADILLAC
MOTORS.
Subtyping has the effect of making the schema as a whole
more inclusive, allowing the category to be applied to a wider
variety of stimuli and extending the underlying knowledge
structure. In a sense, subtyping “stretches” the schema, allowing
more stimuli to fall within its bounds.
1. Schema Theory and Product Proximity
A straightforward interpretation of schema theory suggests
that when consumers are offered a junior mark in a product
category that is different from the senior mark’s category (e.g., a
CADILLAC brand notebook computer), the likelihood that
consumers will categorize the product as a subtype of the senior
mark (i.e., the likelihood that consumers will suffer confusion) is
related to the product’s incongruity with the senior mark’s schema.
Subtyping is more likely for moderately incongruent products
because they are seen as more plausible subtypes than severely
incongruent products.
As described thus far, the implications of schema theory are
consistent with the “competitive proximity” factor considered in
the law. If the junior mark is in a product category that is low in
“competitive proximity” with the senior mark, consumers will find
subtyping to be implausible and will therefore be unlikely to suffer
confusion.
2. Schema Theory and “Gap-Bridging”
What is the relevance of “gap-bridging” under this model? In
the language of marketing, “gap-bridging” would be termed a
brand extension—that is, a current brand name that is applied to
a new product in a completely new product category,80 such as
Hershey’s extension of REESE’S brand of candy into the peanut
butter category as a competitor of ConAgra Food’s PETER PAN
and J.M. Smucker’s JIF peanut butters.
80. David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions,
54 J. of Mktg. 27-41 (1990).
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The managerial practice of brand extension into even far flung
markets is rampant and on the rise.81 The proliferation of brand
extensions is a fundamental reality of the marketplace in the 21st
century.82 For example, Mannheim Steamroller, a new age musical
group well known for its holiday music CDs, extended its brand
into a line of ready mix hot chocolate. Victoria’s Secret makes a
line of laundry products including detergent and fabric softener.
Bic, the famous makers of pens, lighters, and shavers extended its
brand into cologne and perfume. Harley Davidson has introduced
branded wine coolers. Both Honda and Toyota launched boats.
Crayola, the famous wax crayon brand, extended into popsicles.
General Mills extended the WHEATIES brand in a line of
multivitamins. And the U.K. brand VIRGIN has been vastly
extended across the breadth and width of the marketplace. As just
a few examples, Virgin is a record label (VIRGIN MUSIC), and
sells music and sundries (VIRGIN MEGASTORES), air travel
(VIRGIN ATLANTIC), gas and electric utilities (VIRGIN
ENERGY), soft drinks (VIRGIN COLA), Internet service (VIRGIN
NET), banking and credit card service (VIRGIN ONE), mobile
phone service (VIRGIN MOBILE), vodka (VIRGIN VODKA), and
even space tourism (VIRGIN GALACTIC).
Of particular interest in the present hypothetical are brand
extensions by a competitor of the senior mark. Our hypothesis on
this point embraces the consumer-centric approach to “gapbridging” in the case law.83 In light of the schema model developed
above, we anticipate that if the competitor of the senior mark
extends its brand into a new product category, then consumers will
view a new product in that new product category from the senior
mark (or a junior mark that appears to be the senior mark) as
more plausible. Consider again CADILLAC MOTORS as the senior
mark. A CADILLAC brand notebook computer may be too
implausible to be commonly subtyped by consumers. But if
consumers believe a brand of luxury automobiles other than
CADILLAC (e.g., MERCEDES-BENZ) has already extended its
brand into the notebook computer market, consumers would
evaluate a CADILLAC notebook computer as more plausible and
would, therefore, be more likely to suffer confusion when faced
with a junior mark of CADILLAC brand notebook computers.

81. Kevin L. Keller, Strategic Brand Management, Upper (2003) (noting that between
80 and 90 percent of all products introduced each year are either line or brand extensions of
existing products).
82. Kevin J. Clancy & Jack Trout, Brand Confusion, 80 Harvard Bus. Rev. 22 (2002);
Richard Gibson, The End of the Line? Overkill on Extensions, Wall St. J., June 18, 1990, at
B1.
83. See the discussion accompanying text at supra notes 39-47.
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This expectation is based on an application of the aspects of
schema theory reviewed above. When MERCEDES-BENZ extends
its brand by introducing a notebook computer, consumers are
expected to modify their MERCEDES-BENZ schema by adding a
new subtype: the MERCEDES-BENZ NOTEBOOK COMPUTER
schema. This stretches the MERCEDES-BENZ schema to be more
inclusive of new stimuli. Because the MERCEDES-BENZ schema
is part of the LUXURY VEHICLE schema, the superordinate
schema is stretched as well in the sense that a wider variety of
stimuli can now be categorized as belonging to the LUXURY
VEHICLE schema. Because CADILLAC MOTORS is also part of
the LUXURY VEHICLE schema, a CADILLAC brand notebook
computer would only be moderately incongruent with the
consumer’s existing schemata. As a result, a CADILLAC notebook
computer is more plausible than it would be in the absence of the
MERCEDES-BENZ brand extension. With this higher plausibility
comes a greater likelihood of subtyping and, therefore, confusion.
This theoretical reasoning is consistent with associative
network models of memory,84 which suggest that because
CADILLAC and MERCEDES-BENZ are both well-known luxury
automotive brands, the CADILLAC MOTORS memory node and
the MERCEDES-BENZ memory node are linked in consumers’
memories. When MERCEDES-BENZ extends its brand into the
notebook computer category, consumers will form a memory link
between the MERCEDES-BENZ memory node and the
NOTEBOOK COMPUTER memory node.85 As a result, the
CADILLAC MOTORS node will be more closely (but not directly)
linked with the NOTEBOOK COMPUTER node. When
subsequently presented with a CADILLAC NOTEBOOK
COMPUTER, an associative link between the CADILLAC
MOTORS node and the NOTEBOOK COMPUTER node is quicker
and easier for consumers to form (as compared to a situation of no
brand extension for MERCEDES-BENZ). The ease of forming
associative links has been shown to be used by consumers as a
heuristic in decision making,86 with the end result that consumers
accept CADILLAC brand notebook computers as plausibly being
sponsored by CADILLAC MOTORS.
84. Maureen Morrin, The Impact of Brand Extensions on Parent Brand Memory
Structures and Retrieval Processes, 36 J. of Mktg. Res. 517-25 (1999).
85. Paul M. Herr, Peter H. Farquhar & Russell H. Fazio, The Impact of Dominance and
Relatedness on Brand Extensions, 5 J. of Consumer Psych. 135-59 (1996).
86. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychology 207-32 (1973); Norbert Schwarz, Herbert
Bless, Fritz Strack, Gisela Klumpp, Helga Rittenauer-Schatka, & Annette Simons, Ease of
Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic, 61 J. of Personality &
Social Psychology 195-202 (1991); Angela Y. Lee & Aparna Labroo, Effects of Conceptual
and Perceptual Fluency on Affective Judgment, 41 J. of Mktg. Res. 151-65 (2004).
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The implications of schema theory described here are also
consistent with an assumption that consumers form rational
expectations based on their past experiences in the marketplace.
During many years of playing the role of consumer, people are
likely to have observed that firms commonly follow a pioneerfollower pattern with brand extensions. For example, after Dell
extended from computers into plasma flat-screen televisions,
longtime computer rival Gateway responded with a similar brand
extension. Likewise, after Kawasaki extended from motorcycles
into personal watercraft, competitor Honda responded with a
similar brand extension. Because this pioneer-follower pattern is
so frequently followed in the marketplace,87 consumers may expect
that the extension by Mercedes-Benz into the notebook computer
market will be followed by other luxury automakers (e.g.,
CADILLAC MOTORS). As a result, CADILLAC brand notebook
computer will thereafter be plausible to consumers.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF “SOPHISTICATION”
AND “GAP-BRIDGING” AS FACTORS IN THE
ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The above discussion sets the stage for our empirical study of
the sophistication and “gap-bridging” factors. With respect to the
latter, our hypothesis is that if a senior mark’s direct competitor
extends into a new product category, consumers are more likely to
be confused by a junior mark in the new product category.
H1: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, the likelihood of confusion from a
junior mark in the new product category will increase (versus
no brand extension by the competitor of the senior mark).
This hypothesis implicates two dimensions of the conflict in the
case law detailed above. First, H1 embraces the view of the
minority of courts that consider the likelihood of brand extension—
“bridging the gap”—as a relevant plus-factor for consumer
confusion. Although the courts tend to discount or even ignore this
factor,88 H1 suggests that the likelihood of bridging the gap can be
an important consideration in assessing the likelihood of
confusion. Second, the hypothesis also has implications for the
nature of the “bridging the gap” factor and for its method of proof
in the courts. We posit that the likelihood of consumer confusion
will be enhanced by a consumer-expectation approach to bridging

87. Peter N. Golder & Gerard J. Tellis, Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or
Marketing Legend? 30 J. of Mktg. Res., 158-70 (1993).
88. See Beebe, supra note 1, at 1591, Table 1.
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the gap: that consumers will be more vulnerable to confusion if
they expect brand extension by the senior mark, even in the
absence of any concrete plans.
For the effect in H1 to manifest, in the terms of the continuing
hypothetical, consumers must update the MERCEDES-BENZ
schema and also the superordinate LUXURY VEHICLE schema,
and they must retrieve and carefully consider the CADILLAC
schema when categorizing the CADILLAC brand laptop computer.
In performing this cognitive activity, we hypothesize that
sophisticated consumers will be more likely to be confused.
Specifically, consumers with greater ability to process such
information will be facilitated in the cognitive schema-updating
tasks noted above.
Our second and third hypotheses evaluate the impact of a
series of considerations utilized by the courts as proxies for abilityrelated sophistication. Under H2, we consider a set of proxies for
sophistication—consumer expertise and educational attainment—
that find support in the theoretical foundations of consumer
psychology. Under H3, we look at other consumer sophistication
proxies adopted by the courts—gender, age, and income—that are
not well-supported in consumer theory.
First, we hypothesize that consumers with greater expertise in
the junior product category will be more likely to be confused.
H2a: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, consumers with higher expertise in
the new product category will be more likely to be confused by
a junior mark in the new product category (versus consumers
with lower expertise).
This hypothesis finds support in our consumer psychology model.
Consumers having greater expertise in a product category have
extended knowledge structures stored in long-term memory that
enable them to notice and process new information more carefully
and to capture and parse nuance of meaning unavailable to more
novice consumers.89 Thus, more expert consumers will attend to
and comprehend the details of advertising for products in their
area of expertise and will be better able to integrate that
information with existing knowledge relative to their more novice
counterparts. These expert consumers are thus more likely to
notice the details of competitors’ brand extensions thus updating
their more elaborate schema for the category, which in turn will
increase the plausibility of further brand extensions across the
same category gap.

89. Eric J. Johnson & J. Edward Russo, Product Familiarity and Learning New
Information, 11 J. of Consumer Res. 542-50 (1984).
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Second, we make a similar hypothesis for consumers with
more generalized ability not specific to the product category:90
H2b: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, consumers with higher generalized
consumer expertise will be more likely to be confused by a
junior mark in the new product category (versus consumers
with lower generalized consumer expertise).
Our model provides similar support for this hypothesis: Certain
individuals are consistently and trans-situationally more involved
in consumption and marketplace activities than are others;91 their
continued interest in consumption and the marketplace produces
familiarity and expertise that increases the ability of these
consumers to process market information (such as advertising and
other marketing communications) more carefully. As with product
category expertise, these generalized experts are more likely to
attend to and process more carefully the details of brand
extensions in the marketplace, making further extensions across
similar marketplace boundaries seem more plausible. On the other
hand, consumers with lower generalized consumer ability will
have more restricted cognitive structures to work with when
processing market information and thus are less likely to encode
details of marketplace information. The more attenuated cognitive
processing of these “less sophisticated” consumers will make it less
likely that consumers will register individual brand extensions.
Third, formal education also may facilitate the processing of
marketplace information.92 More educated consumers thus are also
more likely to process the details of brand extensions by
competitors in the marketplace and in turn to find similar brand
extensions plausible. This suggests that:
H2c: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, consumers with higher education will
be more likely to be confused by a junior mark in the new
product category (vs. consumers with lower education).
Consumer expertise and educational attainment are conceptually
similar to the forms of consumer ability considered by the law
under the umbrella term “sophistication.” Thus, H2a, H2b and H2c

90. Lawrence F. Feick & Linda L. Price, The Market Maven: A Diffuser of Marketplace
Information, 51 J. of Mktg. 83-97 (1987).
91. Harold H. Kassarjian, Low Involvement: A Second Look, 8 Advances in Consumer
Research 31-34 (1981); Mark E. Slama & Armen Tachchian, Selected Socioeconomic and
Demographic Characteristics Associated with Purchasing Involvement, 49 J. Marketing, 72,
73 (1985).
92. Studies have shown that educational attainment will facilitate cognitive ability. See
Lampert, supra note 58, at 17-18.
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implicate additional dimensions of the case law conflicts described
above. We hypothesize that these forms of consumer sophistication
will make consumer confusion more likely in circumstances where
a competitor of a senior mark has extended its brand into the
product category occupied by the junior user. Under such
circumstances, and for theoretical reasons explained above, our
hypotheses reject the general rule in the case law—which assumes
a negative correlation between sophistication and consumer
confusion—and provides at least one basis for finding a positive
correlation.
Next, we also consider some other proxies for consumer
sophistication that are not well supported by the consumer
psychology model of consumer sophistication. Because some courts
have held that women are more careful and thus more
sophisticated consumers than men, gender is directly
investigated.93 In this context, where greater care is theoretically
expected to lead to greater confusion, it is hypothesized that:
H3a: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, females will be more likely to be
confused by a junior mark in the new product category (versus
males).
Next, given that the courts frequently assume a positive
correlation between increasing age and increased consumer care,
age is directly investigated. Generally it is held that older
consumers are sophisticated,94 while younger consumers are
believed to be as relatively careless.95 Following the intuition of the
courts, it is hypothesized that:
H3b: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, older consumers will be more likely to
be confused by a junior mark in the new product category
(versus younger consumers).
Finally, while there is no theoretical foundation for the
expectation that income or wealth correlates directly with the
ability related aspects of customer sophistication, some courts have
held that “low income groups” are “less sophisticated shoppers

93. 3 McCarthy, supra note 18, § 23:99.
94. See e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 188,
199 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding consumers of wine, who are likely to be older than the general
population, to be relatively sophisticated).
95. See e.g., Blake Publ’g Corp. v. O’Quinn Studios, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. 848, 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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than wealthier purchasers.”96 Following these judicial findings, it
is hypothesized that:
H3c: If a competitor of the senior mark extends its brand into
a new product category, higher-income consumers will be more
likely to be confused by a junior mark in the new product
category (versus lower-income consumers).
Taken together, our empirical study of H1 through H3 has the
potential to offer some concrete empirical answers to questions
heretofore resolved only on the basis of judicial “intuition” and
subjective “stereotypes.”97 Our empirical results are particularly
important because they address questions marked by hollow
disputes in the case law—such as whether and when
sophistication may cut in favor of confusion, whether and when the
likelihood of “bridging the gap” may cut against it, and whether or
not factors like formal education, purchasing experience, gender,
age, and income are relevant.
A. Method
1. Participants
To test our hypotheses, a study was conducted in which 495
people participated in an online questionnaire in return for a $1
cash-equivalent incentive.98 Rather than attempting to simulate a
naturalistic purchase environment for laptop computers, controlled
research settings such as this are used to limit extraneous
influences and focus the study on the variables of interest.99
2. Stimuli
With the goal of creating stimuli to test the hypotheses, a wellknown automotive brand (CADILLAC) was chosen as the senior
mark. Notebook computers were chosen as a product category for
the junior mark because notebook computers were anticipated to
be relevant to online participants. A fictitious junior mark

96. Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also
Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 220 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Defendants gear their
program not to the discriminating professional but rather to the public in general, especially
those members in the lower income, less sophisticated ‘market.’”); Citibank, N.A. v.
Citytrust, 596 F. Supp. 369, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (identifying an instance of actual confusion
in the record and noting that such consumer “might fairly be characterized as sophisticated
if there is a correlation between accumulation of wealth and sophistication”).
97. Bartow, supra note 3, at 723, 772.
98. Participants were recruited from a random sample of the 1.7 million member
Authentic Response online research panel.
99. Richard L. Henshel, The Purposes of Laboratory Experimentation and the Virtues of
Deliberate Artificiality, 16 J. of Experimental Social. Psychology 466-78 (1980).
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(CADILLAC brand notebook computers) was then created, along
with an advertisement that described an upscale, luxurious
notebook computer that could be offered by a firm attempting to
infringe on the CADILLAC trademark. The following advertising
text was introduced with the claim that it would “appear in the
next edition of a popular computer-sales catalog.”
Cadillac brand notebook computer! This luxury notebook has
an upgraded keyboard for better feel and absolutely silent
typing. A dark mahogany inlay surrounds the screen.
Matching dark mahogany accents are found on the wireless
mouse and the leather carrying case. Intel Core 2 Quad
Q6700, 4GB RAM, 200GB Hard Drive. Price available upon
request.
H1 suggests that viewers of this advertisement will be more
likely to suffer confusion by believing CADILLAC MOTORS to be
the source of the notebook computer if another maker of luxury
automobiles has already extended its brand into the luxury
notebook computer product category. To test this hypothesis, three
stimuli were created. The first stimulus (see Figure 1) was an
experimental control designed to represent a typical advertisement
for a notebook computer at the time of the study. The
advertisement emphasized computing power and did not attempt
to create an upscale positioning with luxurious product attributes.
The second stimulus informed participants of the launch of an
upscale notebook computer (see Figure 2). Luxurious product
attributes such as a titanium case were described in support of an
upscale positioning. This second stimulus was another
experimental control because the upscale notebook computer was
described as being offered by a well-known computer company
(Dell) rather than by an automotive company.
The third stimulus (see Figure 3) informed participants of the
launch of an upscale notebook computer as a brand extension of a
well-known automotive brand (MERCEDES-BENZ). To encourage
participants to subtype the notebook computer in the
MERCEDES-BENZ schema, the ad included a photo of a
MERCEDES-BENZ car and a close-up of a MERCEDES-BENZ
hood ornament. By comparing viewers of this stimulus with
viewers of the two control stimuli, H1 can be tested.
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Figure 1: Stimulus Shown in Condition 1 (Control Condition).

Figure 2: Stimulus Shown in Condition 2 (Control Condition).
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Figure 3: Stimulus Shown in Condition 3 (Treatment Condition).
3. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to view either the typical
DELL computer advertisement (condition 1, n = 167), the luxury
DELL computer advertisement (condition 2, n = 165), or the luxury
MERCEDES-BENZ computer advertisement (condition 3, n = 163).
The experimental method was used to provide a rigorous test of
the causality claimed in H1.100 Depending on the assigned
experimental condition, one of the three stimuli was shown as part
of an online questionnaire instrument. The stimulus was shown in
full-color, and the time of exposure was self-paced. Participants
then completed a filler task to mask the purposes of the study.
They were then shown the advertisement for the CADILLAC
notebook computer and asked to complete the source-confusion
battery (described below).
The study’s independent variables were then measured.
Similar to previous research,101 expertise was operationalized in
100. Roger Kirk, Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences (1995).
101. See, e.g., J. Edward Russo & France Leclerc, An Eye-Fixation Analysis of Choice
Processes for Consumer Nondurables, 21 J. Consumer Res. 274, 282 (1994); see also Ronald
D. Anderson, Evaluating the Relationships Among Attitude Toward Business Product
Satisfaction, Experience, and Search Effort, 16 J. of Marketing Res. 394, 396 (1979).
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this study as the number of computers the participant had
purchased within the last five years. Based on previous
research,102 participants who have purchased computers more
often can be expected to have a greater level of expertise with
computer purchasing and computer brands.
Generalized consumer expertise was measured with the overclaiming technique—a method used by previous researchers103 to
measure the construct. The ability of participants to recognize
brands in a wide variety of consumer product categories (and avoid
claiming familiarity with fictitious brand foils) is measured with
the technique. As such, the over-claiming technique is an
application of signal detection theory, which has been applied to a
wide variety of topics inside104 and outside105 the legal literature.
Signal detection analysis researchers have embraced more than
one method for scoring the accuracy of responses; the d’ scoring

102. See Alba & Hutchinson, supra note 59, at 415-17.
103. Craig Nathanson et al., Controlling Response Bias in the Measurement of Consumer
Knowledge, presented at the meeting of the Assoc. for Psychological Science, Washington,
D.C. (2007). A related application of the over-claiming technique has been the measurement
of generalized cognitive ability (Delroy L. Paulhus & P. D. Harms, Measuring Cognitive
Ability with the Overclaiming Technique, 32 Intelligence 297, 298 (2004) and also Delroy L.
Paulhus et al., The Over-claiming Technique: Measuring Bias Independent of Accuracy, 84
J. of Personality & Social Psychology, 681, 681 (2003)).
104. In the legal literature, signal detection theory has been applied to consumer
information and antritrust law (Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and the Flow of
Consumer Information, 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 1029, 1065 (1991)), judicial decision making
(Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L. J. 1299, 1331 n.93 (1977)), eyewitness identification (Dawn
McQuiston-Surrett, Sequential vs. Simultaneous Lineups, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 137,
159 (2006)), firearms identification (Victoria L. Phillips et al, The Application of Signal
Detection Theory to Decision-making in Forensic Science, 46 J Forensic Sci., 294, 302
(2001)), jurors’ presumption of innocence (Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates,
the Presumption of Guilt, Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 1051, 1053 (2003)) and prosecutors’ judgments regarding evidence (Darryl K. Brown,
The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 Cal.
L. Rev. 1585, 1600 (2005)). For a general review of signal detection theory as it has been
applied to the abilities of humans to make judgments in uncertain environments, see Neil A.
Macmillan & C. Douglas Creelman, Detection Theory: A User's Guide (2d ed. 2005).
105. For example, signal detection theory has been applied to aptitude testing (David
Marvin Green & John A. Swets, Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics (1966)),
memory testing (William P. Banks, Signal Detection Theory and Human Memory, 74
Psychology Bull., 81 (1970)), medical diagnosis (John A Swets, Signal Detection Theory and
ROC Analysis in Psychology and Diagnostics: Collected Papers (1996)), accounting
judgments (Robert J. Ramsay & Richard M. Tubbs, Analysis of Diagnostic Tasks in
Accounting Research Using Signal Detection Theory, 17 Behavioral Research in Accounting,
149 (2005)) and weather forecasting (Lewis O. Harvey Jr. et al., The Application of Signal
Detection Theory to Weather Forecasting Behavior, 120 Monthly Weather R., 863 (1992)).
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method was used here because it is the most commonly used
method106 for measures such as the over-claiming technique.
The education of the participant was measured as the number
of years of formal education, including high school and any
education after high school. Lastly, the participant’s age, gender,
and household income were measured via self-report.
The source-confusion battery measured the outcome of
interest: whether the participant judged the CADILLAC brand
notebook computer to have been manufactured or licensed by
Cadillac Motors. Detecting such judgments among participants is
somewhat difficult because straightforward measurement scales
may lead to social desirability effects107 and reactivity effects (e.g.,
asking participants directly if they thought the automaker was the
source of the notebook may prompt participants to consider the
automaker for the first time). The company identification method
of Simonson108 was used to measure whether the participant
experienced confusion (including confusion as to source,
sponsorship, or affiliation). Following Simonson,109 participants
were shown the junior mark (i.e., the ad for the CADILLAC brand
notebook computer) but not the senior mark. Similar to
Simonson,110 the participants who reported that they believed
CADILLAC MOTORS was the source of the product were coded as
having suffered confusion.
The specific questions and coding for the measure of confusion
were as follows: after viewing the advertisement for the
CADILLAC brand notebook computer, participants were asked
three questions in an open-ended format: (1) “What company
makes the notebook computer described in the catalog?” (2) “What
makes you think so?” and (3) “What other products (if any) does
that company also make?” Participants were then asked the
following question: “Products manufactured by one company are
sometimes (but not always) approved, licensed or sponsored by
another company. Consider the notebook computer described
above. Do you think it was approved, licensed or sponsored by
another company?” Participants who responded affirmatively were
then asked two more open-ended questions: (1) “What company do

106. Ramsay & Tubbs, supra note 105, at 155 (commenting that the d’ measure of
accuracy is the one “traditionally employed.”) Instructions for calculating the d’ score are
given by Macmillan & Creelman, supra note 104.
107. See Bradlee R. Boal, Techniques for Ascertaining Likelihood of Confusion and the
Meaning of Advertising Communications, 73 TMR 405-35 (1983) (noting that participants
may be reluctant to admit confusion to avoid an appearance of stupidity).
108. Itamar Simonson, Trademark Infringement From the Buyer Perspective: Conceptual
Analysis and Measurement Implications, 13 J. of Pub. Plcy. & Mktg., 181-99 (1994).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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you think approved, licensed, or sponsored the notebook
computer?” and (2) “What other products (if any) does that
company also make?”
In accordance with the way these measures have been used
previously,111 it was decided a priori that participants would be
coded as having suffered brand confusion if their responses to the
source-confusion battery clearly referred to the automaker as the
source of the notebook computer. For example, a participant who
used phrases such as “It’s General Motors,” “It’s the Detroit
automaker,” or “They make cars and SUVs” would be coded as
having experienced confusion.
B. Results
Two independent coders blind to the hypotheses and the
experimental conditions evaluated each participant’s responses to
the open-ended questions in the source-confusion battery. Using
the coding scheme described above, each participant was coded as
either “confused” or “not confused.” Intercoder reliability was very
high (coding agreement = 99%, kappa = .96). The few
disagreements between coders were resolved by discussion.
1. Testing H1
To test H1, the overall proportion of participants who were
confused was calculated for each experimental condition. In
condition 1, 12 percent of participants were confused, as compared
to 18 percent in condition 2 and 39 percent in condition 3. A ChiSquare test (X2 = 36.34, df = 2, p < .001) indicates the three
conditions do not have the same proportion of confused
participants (i.e., at least one of the conditions is different from the
others).
Comparing condition 1 to condition 2, the proportions of
confused participants were not statistically different (Fisher's
Exact Test p > .05). Because there was no difference between
likelihood of confusion for the two control conditions, it can be
concluded that the likelihood of confusion for the CADILLAC
notebook computer was not increased by an introduction of an
upscale notebook computer under the DELL brand.
Most important for the test of H1 is the comparison between
conditions 1 and 3. The proportion of confused participants in
condition 1 (12 percent) was compared to the proportion of
confused participants in condition 3 (39 percent), and the two
proportions were found to be statistically different (Fisher’s Exact
Test p < .001). Thus, as predicted by H1, it can be concluded that

111. Id.
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the introduction of an upscale notebook computer under the
MERCEDES-BENZ brand caused an increase in the likelihood of
confusion.
It could be argued that it was merely the introduction of an
upscale notebook computer in condition 3 that caused the observed
increase in likelihood of confusion, rather than the product’s
branding as an extension of the MERCEDES-BENZ trademark. To
test this alternate explanation for the findings, conditions 2 and 3
were compared. The proportions of confused participants in these
two conditions were statistically different (Fisher’s Exact Test p <
.001), suggesting that even when compared to the launch of an
upscale DELL notebook computer, the launch of an upscale
MERCEDES-BENZ notebook computer caused an increase in the
likelihood of confusion.
2. Testing H2 and H3
Combined, H2 and H3 predict that a variety of constructs will
influence the likelihood of confusion when Mercedes-Benz has
extended its brand into the notebook computer category. To test
these hypotheses, the probability of confusion among participants
in condition 3 was modeled as a function of the measured
independent variables using logistic regression:
log(p / (1 - p)) = Intercept + β1 ProductExpertise + β2 ConsumerExpertise
+ β3 Education + β4 Gender + β5 Age + β6 Income

In this formula, p is the probability of confusion, ProductExpertise
is the measure of the participant’s expertise with purchasing
computers, ConsumerExpertise is the measure of the participant’s
generalized consumer expertise, Education is the number of years
of the participant’s formal education, Gender is coded 0 for male
participants and 1 for female participants, Age is the participant’s
age (in years), and Income is the participant’s household income.
The estimated logistic regression coefficients for each condition are
summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1. Logistic Regression Results

Parameter

β Estimate

Intercept

-4.16

0.38
ProductExpertise
0.61
ConsumerExpertise
0.15
Education
-0.45
Gender
0.01
Age
0.09
Income
* p < .05

Standard Error
of β Estimate

1.03 **
0.16 *
0.15 **
0.07 *
0.44
0.01
0.06

** p < .0001

The estimated coefficient for ProductExpertise was found to be
statistically significant (p < .01) and positive, suggesting that the
variable was associated with increased likelihood of confusion.
That is, in the context of a brand extension by Mercedes-Benz into
the notebook computer product category, participants who had
higher expertise in purchasing computers were more likely to
suffer confusion when viewing the CADILLAC notebook computer.
This finding supports H2a.
As shown in the table, the estimated coefficients for
ConsumerExpertise (p < .001) and Education (p < .05) were also
statistically significant and positive, suggesting that generalized
consumer expertise and education were also associated with
increased likelihood of confusion when participants were exposed
to a MERCEDES-BENZ notebook computer. These findings
support hypotheses H2b and H2c.
As also shown in the table, the estimated coefficients for
Gender, Age and Income were statistically nonsignificant. This
suggests that, in the context of a MERCEDES-BENZ brand
extension into the notebook computer category, none of these
variables influence the likelihood of confusion in any significant
way. Thus, H3a, H3b and H3c were not supported.
V. CONCLUSION
The theoretical and empirical tools utilized in the scholarly
study of consumer behavior hold the potential to inform a broad
range of conflicts in trademark law. Two such conflicts concern the

948

Vol. 98 TMR

relevance and methods of proving the consumer “sophistication”
and competitive “gap-bridging” factors in the judicial evaluation of
the likelihood of confusion. Theoretical modeling and empirical
testing allow us to take important steps beyond the stereotypes
and impressionism that dominate the courts’ consideration of these
issues.
As for “gap-bridging,” our study offers theoretical and
empirical support for the hypothesis that a brand extension by a
competitor of the senior mark increases the likelihood of confusion.
Utilizing schema theory, we explain that consumers are likely to
find an extension by the senior mark to be more plausible if a
competitor of the senior mark has already made such an extension.
With this increased plausibility comes an increased likelihood of
schema subtyping and, therefore, an increased likelihood of
confusion. The theoretical basis for the hypothesis finds support in
our empirical study, which shows that consumers are significantly
more likely to be confused by the introduction of a CADILLAC
brand notebook computer if they have already been exposed to a
MERCEDES-BENZ brand entry into that market.
Our analysis supports the view of a minority of the federal
circuits that expressly consider the likelihood of “gap-bridging” as
a factor in the likelihood of confusion calculus. We offer theoretical
and empirical grounds for giving weight to this factor. Our
analysis suggests that those circuits that have not embraced the
“gap-bridging” factor should do so.
This factor arguably has only increased in practical
significance of late, given the increasingly brand-extended world
that we live in. Our analysis lends substantial weight to the
relevance of this “widely adopted strategy,”112 because it indicates
that every new brand extension makes an entire set of trademarks
(i.e., all the competitors of the extended brand) more vulnerable to
source confusion. Moreover, the common practice of multiple brand
extension (e.g., Honda’s marine engines, weed trimmers, and jet
aircraft) provides important benefits to managers.113 Such multiple
brand extensions make their competitors vulnerable to source
confusion from many different directions. Our study also informs
the debate in the case law on the method of proof of “gap-bridging.”
Where it is considered, “gap-bridging” should be evaluated from a
consumer-expectation standpoint, and not (as some courts have
suggested) merely from the perspective of concrete managerial
plans.

112. Piyush Kumar, The Impact of Cobranding on Customer Evaluation of Brand
Counterextensions, 69 J. of Mktg.,1, 1-18 (2005).
113. Vanitha Swaminathan, Sequential Brand Extensions and Brand Choice Behavior,
56 J. of Bus. Research 431 (2003).
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As for consumer “sophistication,” we have identified
theoretical and empirical support for treating this as a factor that
cuts in favor of the likelihood of confusion (in the circumstances
evaluated here). On a theoretical level, we explain that consumers
with increased ability are those most likely to perform the
cognitive processes necessary to make a connection between a
junior and senior mark, and note that the exercise of consumer
care cannot be expected to dispel that connection in the face of an
apparently identical junior use. Thus, in the case of a junior mark
that is indistinguishable on its face from the senior mark, we find
reason to disagree with the conventional wisdom in the case law
that sophisticated consumers are unlikely to be confused. Our
empirical study supports this view, showing that study
participants with greater “ability” to perform the sourceidentification judgment were more likely to be confused by the
CADILLAC notebook computer.
Finally, our empirical study provides preliminary grounds for
evaluating some judicial stereotypes of the “sophisticated”
consumer. Three such stereotypes find preliminary confirmation in
our data, in that confusion correlated positively in our study with
product expertise, general consumer expertise, and educational
attainment. For these consumers, their “sophistication” appears to
enhance their ability to update the relevant memory schemata
with information about brand extension, resulting in increased
vulnerability to confusion. As for other stereotypes in the case law
(e.g., that gender, age, and income affect the ability aspects of
“sophistication”), however, we found no significant effect on the
likelihood of confusion. Our analysis thus calls into question the
judicial use of these stereotypes in the evaluation of the likelihood
of confusion calculus.
Our approach is intended as a beginning, not an end, of a
careful scholarly examination of the factors considered by the
courts in their evaluation of the likelihood of confusion. On these
and other factors, the theoretical and empirical tools employed by
those who study consumer psychology can continue to inform and
transform the law in a field that expressly relies on assumptions
about consumer behavior.

